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NEWNESS, IMPERIALISM, AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REFORM IN
OUR TIME: A TWAIL PERSPECTIVE©
BY OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR"
We can only speak to these critical events ... as they unfold before our own eyes, from our
own unhappy situatedness; the Clio's couch, the disengagement that only distance may bring,
is not for us the gift of time. We have to struggle, as best we can, to make sense of current
developments, amidst ever menacing forms of infliction of traumatic human suffering. This
struggle is necessary, especially in an emergent global milieu rife with what early Habermas
was to name as "systematically distorted communication."
-Upendra Baxi, Operation Enduring Freedom: Toward a New International Law and Order?'
The September 11 attacks on the United States have become the pretext for the renewal of
a world order centred on ... domination.
-Makau Mutua, Terrorism and Human Rights: Power, Culture, and Subordination
2
Nolumus [the refusal to learn from foreigners and from the past] is a self-defeating response.
-Ivan Head, Our Global Circumstance
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article examines, from a critical Third World Approaches to
International Law (TWAIL) perspective,4 the highly consequential claim that
the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 ("9/11")
inaugurated a new era of international relations in so radically significant
a way as to justify the retrenchment or severe weakening of certain
fundamental, indeed constitutional, norms of international law, such as: the
absolute ban on the practice of torture; the prohibition of the unilateral use
of force by states, established by article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations (the UN Charter); and the ban on pre-emptive strikes that do not
conform to the requirements of article 51 of that same treaty.' The article
thus focuses on the "newness claim" that is often made in justification of
the touted necessity of such reforms, and on the important insights that
TWAIL analysis provides regarding the coherence, legitimacy, and
sustainability of this newness claim. What would international lawyers see
(or better, understand) were they to firmly inscribe the broadly shared
experiences of "third-world" peoples into the texts and consciousness of the
current "post-9/11" debates on "newness" and international law reform?
One major conclusion of this article is that the newness claim is best
understood as a deeply political practice. The very process of asserting
newness is, at least in the present context, a key political manoeuvre that
allows proponents of radical international reform of the sort already noted
4 For descriptions of its nature, and brief histories of its intellectual origins and foundations, see
James Thuo Gathii, "Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory" (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l L.J. 263; See also Karin
Mickelson, "Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse" (1998) 16 Wis.
Int'l L.J. 353 [Mickelson].
5 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
10 December 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [CA TI; Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945
No. 7.
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to justify, more successfully than was previously possible, many of their pre-
existing imperial ambitions. The 9/11 attacks have provided much cover for
the implementation of longstanding, but previously far less tenable,
international law-reform projects.
Another major argument made in this article is that only by
discounting (quite heavily in many cases) the broadly shared historical
experiences of many "third-world" peoples can the 9/11 attacks be seen as
inaugural of a world order that is so significantly new or different as to
necessitate the retrenchment or severe weakening of fundamental
international law norms. By placing a single country's experience in the
foreground, and the experience of the vast majority of the world in the
background, a particular picture of the world is constructed; one that
furthers a particular kind of political project. Put differently, this article will
show that it is through the subtle displacement of third-world suffering
from internationalist consciousness that the construction of this "post-9/1 1"
world as a significantly new world order has been made possible.
The third major argument that is made in this article is that,
especially in this "post-9/11" era, TWAIL analysis remains an extremely
useful, if not invaluable, international law optic that allows us to understand
much better, and respond much more adequately to, the sophisticated and
subtle processes through which these kinds of newness claims are deployed
in order to render otherwise untenable reforms of the international legal
order seemingly necessary and even imperative. As a powerful counterpoint
and trans-optic to the imaginings, assertions, and even theories of newness
that have grounded most "post-9/11" proposals for international law
reform, TWAIL analysis is an important resource for challenging the
coherence, legitimacy, and sustainability of the touted reform projects
themselves, and the imperial global order they frame.
After briefly examining in Parts II and III the sense in which the
expression "Third World" is used in this article, and the nature of some
TWAIL analytic techniques and sensibilities, the balance of the article will
be devoted to a systematic examination of the coherence, legitimacy, and
sustainability of the newness claim. Following this analytic exercise, the
article will end with a brief pointer to the road ahead for those
internationalists who are minded to contest the sophisticated manoeuvres
that the current protagonists of international law reform described above
have tended to launch.
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II. THE "THIRD WORLD" AS A CONTINGENT BUT USEFUL
CATEGORY
The immediate post-cold war era intensified pre-existing debates
about the location, and even existence, of the Third World. During this
period, many commentators, who mostly lived outside the societies that
self-identify as Third World, were quick to proclaim the death of that
expression as a useful analytical category.6 In their view, the category no
longer had much purchase or relevance in a post-cold war world.7
Moreover, they argued, given the huge disparities in resources and power
within the Third World, how could countries like China, Taiwan, and
Singapore continue to be lumped in the same general international political
category as Bhutan, Mauritania, and Jamaica? 8 Many of the sceptics have
also averred that there is a "Third World" within the "First World," and
vice versa.9 These sceptics are not completely wrong. Their arguments
regarding the diversity that exists within the third-world category is of
course correct. They are also right about the existence of some third world-
like communities within the first world.
The whole argument is, however, wrongly framed. What is
important is the existence of a group of states and populations that have
tended to self-identify as such-coalescing around a historical and
continuing experience of subordination at the global level that they feel
they share-not the existence and validity of an unproblematic monolithic
third-world category. That much is undeniable. Now, if these states tend to
complain about similar things, and tend to speak to similar concerns, it is
of course undeniable that, as contingent and problematic as any style they
wish to assign to their grouping is, or can be, that grouping-that sense of
shared experience-does exist and has been repeatedly expressed. What is
more, there is nothing even remotely strange about coalitions being built
or carrying on their work under a certain style, even one that has been
mostly assigned to them (for example, global women's movements), even
6 See e.g. D. Otto, "Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community and
the Incommensurability of Difference" (1996) 5 Soc. & Legal Stud. 337 at 353.
7 For overviews of these kinds of objections, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "Locating the Third
World in Cultural Geography" [1998-99] Third World Legal Stud. 1 [Rajagopal, "Cultural Geography"];
Mickelson, supra note 4.
8 James H. Mittleman & Mustapha Kamal Pasha, Out from Underdevelopment Revisited: Changing
Global Structures and the Remaking of the Third World (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997) at 23.
0
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while they themselves recognize the contingency of that style or category.10
And since categories and the words that represent them only serve as
contingent signifiers (for example, as a contingent signifier, the word
"dance" can shelter even diametrically opposing meanings, or signify
different concepts depending on the spatial or temporal context), if these
peoples tend to continue to self-identify under the banner Third World, it
is difficult to ignore that category without ignoring to a large extent the
shared experience of subordination that it has come to represent, as well as
the strategic deployment of that expression that it obviously entails.
As long as the inevitable contingency of this expression is
understood, and the expression is not inflexibly moored to a fixed
geographic space-but rather to a self-expressed and shared sense of
subordination within the global system-it does retain much relevance even
today, even in this moment of ferment, even in this "post-modern" world.
I am thus in agreement with Balakrishnan Rajagopal that although the
expression needs to be thought of with a more flexible geographic
sensibility, it need not be abandoned." That said, self-identification is
heavily influenced by experience, and the sorts of experience of global
subjugation that often marks third-world coalitions will often reveal and
entail certain kind of maps-certain "geographies of injustice." 2
As such, there is a sense in which states or societies or even scholars
must choose whether or not to self-identify as Third World. 3 As Karin
Mickelson has aptly put it, third-world voices are best imagined as "a
chorus of voices that blend, though not always harmoniously, in attempting
to make heard a common set of concerns. 1 4 While there will be some
tenors in that chorus, there will also be some sopranos, basses, and altos.
These important differences in pitches, resources, and capacities are not
usually sufficient to deny coherence or relevance to a chorus or orchestra.
So for me, and almost all other TWAIL scholars, the Third World
10 For example, as far back as 1983, even before much of the scholarly debate gained currency,
Julius Nyerere, former President of Tanzania, and a key leader of the third-world movement of his time,
wrote about this very issue. See Julius K. Nyerere, "South-South Option" in Altaf Gauhar, ed., The
Third World Strategy: Economic and Political Cohesion in the South (New York: Praeger, 1983) 9
[Nyerere]. Feminist scholars are also aware of the contingency of "women" as an analytical category.
Many of them have recognized the political practices involved in using or abandoning that category. See
J. Oloka-Onyango & Sylvia Tamale, "'The Personal is Political' or Why Women's Rights are Indeed
Human Rights: An African Perspective on International Feminism" (1995) 17 Hum. Rts. Q. 691 at 697-
705 [Oloka-Onyango & Tamale].
See Rajagopal, "Cultural Geography," supra note 7.
12 Baxi, "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Anghie et al., supra note 1 at 46.
13 See Nyerere, supra note 10.
14 Mickelson, supra note 4 at 360.
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remains a crucial analytic category."
III. SOME TWAIL ANALYTIC TECHNIQUES AND
SENSIBILITIES
On a general level, the TWAIL movement within the discipline of
international legal studies is best viewed as a broad dialectic (or large
umbrella) of opposition to the generally unequal, unfair, and unjust
character of an international legal regime that all-to often (but not always)
helps subject the Third World to domination, subordination, and serious
disadvantage. 16 Just like the Third World on which it focuses, TWAIL is not
a monolithic school of thought. No unanimity can be found within its ranks,
and no complete and compulsory liturgy directs its engagement with the
international order. Some strains of TWAIL are more oppositional than
reconstructive, while others are more reconstructive than oppositional. 7
Some TWAIL scholars are avowed socialists (such as Bhupinder Chimni),
but many are not.18 Some can be seen as leaning toward post-structuralism
(such as Rajagopal and Vasuki Nesiah), but many do not accept the
poststructuralist label.' 9 Some are feminists (such as Celestine Nyamu,
Sylvia Tamale, and Nesiah), but many may not make bold to claim that
prize.20 TWAIL is therefore not even close to a theology. Just like the Third
World itself, it may be considered "a chorus of voices" rather than a simple
monolithic collegium.2'
However, despite its healthy internal differences and variegation,
TWAIL scholars (or "TWAILers") are solidly united by a shared ethical
15 See e.g. the collection of essays in Anghie et al., supra note 1.
16 Makau Mutua, "What is TWAIL?" (Paper presented to the American Society of International
Law, Washington, D.C., April 2000) (2000) 94 A.S.I.L. Proc. 31 at 31.
17For instance, while Bhupinder Chimni is an avowed reconstructionist, Joel Ngugi is more
sceptical of the viability of the reconstructionist effort. See B.S. Chimni, "Third World Approaches to
International Law: A Manifesto" in Anghie et aL, supra note 1 [Chimni, "Manifesto"]; Joel Ngugi,
"Making New Wine for Old Wineskins: Can the Reform of International Law Emancipate the Third
World in the Age of Globalization?" (2002) 8 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 73.
18 See B.S. Chimni, "Marxism and International Law: A Contemporary Analysis" Economic and
Political Weekly (6 February 1999), online: Multiworld Network <www.multiworld.org/
m_versity/articles/ chimni.htm >.
19 See Rajagopal, "Cultural Geography," supra note 7; Vasuki Nesiah, "The Ground Beneath Her
Feet: TWAIL Feminisms" in Anghie et al., supra note 1 at 133 [Nesiahl.
20 See Nesiah, ibid; Celestine I. Nyamu, "How Should Human Rights and Development Respond
to Cultural Legitimisations of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?" (2000) 41 Harv. Int'l L.J.
381; and Oloka-Onyango & Tamale, supra note 10.
21 Mickelson, supra note 4 at 360.
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commitment to the intellectual and practical struggle to expose, reform, or
even retrench those features of the international legal system that help
create or maintain the generally unequal, unfair, or unjust global order.
They accomplish this through a commitment to centre the rest rather than
merely the west, thereby taking the lives and experiences of those who have
self-identified as Third World much more seriously than has generally been
the case.
Thus, TWAIL scholars agree:
[International law that was shaped in the colonial era was not a neutral discipline but an
instrument of naked power, skillfully dressed up so as to hide its objective of controlling the
colonized world for the benefit of the colonial powers [and that] ... [t]hough the projection
of power may be the object of the law [that is, international law], hiding such projection is
a necessary one as it would otherwise provoke dissent and contempt for the rules so
fashioned.22
Thus, the international law, which has so often facilitated the achievement
of the goals of the much more powerful societies and states, was extended
throughout the globe as a result of the colonial encounter. As such, TWAIL
scholars are also convinced that understanding and exposing the
technologies and colonial devices of international law is crucial to achieving
an understanding of the nature of the current international legal regime.23
In this sense, Makau Mutua is correct to say that "TWAIL is not a
recent phenomenon."24 It is part of a long tradition of critical
internationalism." Its intellectual and inspirational roots stretch all the way
back to the Afro-Asian anti-colonial struggles of the 1940s-1960s, and even
before that to the Latin American de-colonization movements. 26 It is also
deeply connected to the New International Economic Order/G-77
movements that were launched in the 1960s, carried on into the 1970s, and
stymied by powerful global forces in the 1980s and 1990s. 27 Thus, an earlier
generation of TWAIL scholars (like Upendra Baxi, Mohammed Bedjaoui,
Keba M'baye, and Weeramantry J.) did foreground most of the very same
22 Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, "The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of
Globalization" (2001) 5 S.J.I.C.L. 284 at 285 [emphasis added].
23 Antony Anghie, "Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, and the Third World" (2000) 32 N.Y.U.J. Int'l L & Pol. 243 at 245-46 [Anghie, "Time
Present and Time Past"].
24 Supra note 16 at 31.
25 See James Thuo Gathii, "Rejoinder: TWAILing International Law" (2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev.
2066.
2 6 Ibid.
2 7 Mickelson, supra note 4 at 362-68.
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28
concerns that contemporary TWAIL scholarship now expresses.
However, contemporary TWAIL scholarship has benefited much
from sustained engagement with other critical schools of international legal
scholarship, such as feminist, Critical Legal Studies (CLS), New Approaches
to International Law (NAIL), Marxian, poststructuralist, and critical race
approaches to international law and global politics. 29 Thus, many of the
analytic techniques or sensibilities that TWAIL scholars deploy in their
scrutiny of the international order will be familiar to other critical
internationalists.
The first such technique or sensibility is TWAIL's deep commitment
to taking world history, as opposed to merely Western history, much more
seriously than most internationalists tend to. TWAIL scholars are in
agreement that a historical perspective is key to understanding the current
features of, and debates about, the international system.30 TWAILers are
thus concerned to map the continuities and discontinuities in the historical
development of international legal norms, structures, claims, or rules in
order to better understand the ways in which they facilitate the serious
disadvantages that third-world peoples now suffer. By mapping the
techniques and devices used by the global powers in the past, TWAIL
scholars can recognize the presence of similar techniques in contemporary
international relations. They can then also reveal how those techniques,
morphed or not, continue to work today to sustain or create global
injustice. Of necessity, therefore, TWAIL takes extremely seriously the
history of the colonial subordination of the rest of the world to European
power. TWAIL is concerned with understanding and revealing the ways in
which international law facilitated this colonial encounter, and the extent
to which its role in that encounter is too often replayed and repeated to the
disadvantage of most third-world people. A key TWAIL technique or
sensibility, therefore, is to seek to write the Third World's shared historical
experiences into the processes and outcomes of international thought and
action. That the development of this kind of historical sensibility in
international legal analysis is critical today is underscored by the way in
which the occlusion of the earlier history of U.S. involvement in Iraq works
to allow a particular sense and version of U.S.-Iraq relations to take
28 See Baxi, "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Anghie et al., supra note 1; M. Bedjaoui, Towards
a New International Economic Order (Paris: UNESCO, 1979); and K. M'baye, "Le droit au development
comme un droit de l'homme" (1972) 5 R.D. L'Homme 505.
29 See e.g. Makau Mutua, "Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-
Outsider" (2000) 45 Vill. L. Rev. 841.
3 0 Mickelson, supra note 4 at 406-11 (noting that this deep concern for world history is "the feature
most fundamental to anything one could label a Third World approach to international law" at 406).
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hold-one that seems to legitimize the latest invasion of Iraq in the minds
of far too many observers.3
Another key TWAIL technique or sensibility is to take the equality
of third-world peoples much more seriously: to insist that all thought and
action concerning international law and relations should proceed on the
assumption that third-world peoples deserve no less dignity, no less
security, and no less rights or benefits from international action than do
citizens of Northern states. And so, claims that international law should
allow the "consensual" transfer of toxic waste from the Northern states to
the Third World are rejected when viewed from this kind of equality optic.3"
Claims that states (in practice, the powerful states) ought to enjoy, or
already enjoy, a unilateral right to intervene in third-world societies, when
the converse is virtually impossible in practice, are viewed by most
TWAILers with much deserved suspicion.33 Thus, the TWAIL vision of
equality will, in this connection, extend well beyond formal equality to
include a rejection of international norms or decisions that operate like
Anatole France's law that "equally" prohibits the rich and poor from
sleeping under bridges.34
Informed by their deep attentiveness to the fact that "universality"
and "common humanity" claims have long facilitated and justified Europe's
colonial subjugation and continuing exploitation of much of the Third
World, TWAIL scholars are wary of glib assertions of universality that tend
to elide or mask underlying politics of domination. As Muthucumaraswamy
Sornarajah notes, "a lesson to be learnt [from third-world history] ... is that
one must beware of self-proclaimed universalists whose ... reasons for
taking universalist stances must be constantly scrutinized.
'
"
35
The last key TWAIL technique or sensibility that will be discussed
here is the insistence among TWAIL scholars on thinking through the
various ways of offering epistemic and ideational resistance to the global
31George E. Bisharat, "Facing Tyranny with Justice: Alternatives to War in the Confrontation
with Iraq" (2003) J. Gender Race & Just. 1 at 2-15.
32 See e.g. Cyril Uchenna Gwam, "Travaux Preparatoires of the Basel Convention on the Control
of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal" (2003-04) 18 J. Nat. Resources
& Envtl. L. 1.
B.S. Chimni, "Manifesto" in Anghie et al., supra note 1 at 64; Antony Anghie, "Francisco de
Vittoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law" (1996) 5 Soc. & Legal Stud. 321 [Anghie,
"Francisco de Vittoria"].
34Richard B. Bilder, ed., "The Law and Economics of Global Justice", Book Review of Global
Justice by Thomas W. Pogge, ed. (2002) 96 A.J.I.L. 984 at 984.
35 Supra note 22 at 285.
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hegemonies that their work often unearths or explains.36 In addition, TWAIL
scholars have also explored and analyzed the myriad ways in which
international law and global institutions have, over time, responded to the
resistance posed to them by third-world actors, especially social
movements, and the effects that such resistance has had on law and
institutions.37
IV. THE CHARACTER OF OUR TIME-"NEWNESS" AS A
TECHNOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM
The widely accepted assertion that the kind of terrorism that the
9/11 attacks represented was so significantly "new" as to have ruptured
history and inaugurated a radically new epoch inglobal history, is the major
justification for the transformations in the global normative order that have
been proposed by certain great powers in reaction to those events.3 8 It is the
key justification that has made the proposed changes seem necessary to so
many. For instance, even while distancing himself from those responses to
"post-9/11" terrorism that trample on the "irreducible core of the rule of
law," Thomas Franck has declared that any search for "adjustments in
applicable domestic and international law [relating to the combating of the
al-Qaeda threat] ... must begin with the assumption that terrorism, as
currently practiced, does constitute a new phenomenon: one to which
traditional constitutional and international legal constraints may not be
wholly responsive. 39
In this vein, the plausibility for some commentators of the use of
torture, renderings to torture, and murder in the name of targeted killings,
is almost entirely based on this newness justification-which is that the
globe now confronts a threat that is so significantly new that these otherwise
abhorrent "tools" should now be made available to the security
establishments of states that face terrorist threats.4 °
It is therefore crucial that the widely perceived newness of this
"post-9/11" world be subjected to deeper historical and global, analysis. It
36 B.S. Chimni, "Manifesto" in Anghie et al., supra note 1 at 47.
37Balakrishnan Rajagopal, "International Law and Third World Resistance: A Theoretical
Inquiry" in Anghie et al., supra note 1 at 145.
38 Thomas . Franck, "Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in
Responding to the Threat of Terror" (2004) 98 A.J.I.L. 686 at 688.
3 9 
Ibid.
40 Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the
Challenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) at 131-64 [Dershowitz].
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is as crucial that, like all previous claims to newness (such as "New Labour
politics" in Britain), this contemporary assertion of newness be received
and treated as a deeply political practice. Rupture ought not be received so
easily when continuities leap to the trained eye.
Given its insistence on the critical relevance of shared third-world
experience to the formation of knowledge, policy, and legal norms
regarding our world, TWAIL provides one critical way of subjecting the
widely perceived newness of this historical moment to the kind of rigorous
scrutiny that is proposed here, one that is much more grounded in global
historical experience than on contemporary Western experience of the
globe. A historical analysis of the globe (a key TWAIL technique) will be
essential here. For, as Joanne Meyerowitz has correctly noted, "history
never rips in two. 'Before' and 'after' are never entirely severed, even in the
moments of greatest historical rupture.... In fact, historians devote entire
careers to placing the seemingly new in historical contexts."41
A diverse range of commentators, from George Bush42 to Kofi
Annan,43 have made important arguments in favour of the newness of this
"post-9/11" world. However, in order not to set up a straw argument that
can be responded to with little effort, I will attempt to offer a TWAIL-style
scrutiny of the newness claim that focuses on a formidable defence of that
claim. I will focus on offering a critical analysis of Richard Falk's
intervention in this debate. He is one of the most careful, intelligent, and
distinguished of the progressive internationalist thinkers of our
time-someone with whom I normally find myself in agreement.44
In general, Falk is firmly convinced that 9/11 was a "transformative
event" in global history (and not just in U.S. or Western history), and that
the threat of terrorism that it represents, what he has styled
"megaterrorism," is so significantly new as to justify certain fundamental
reforms in international law and institutions, in particular the invasion of
Afghanistan in "self-defence., 45 In his own words, "[m]egaterrorism is a
unique challenge, differing from earlier expressions of global terrorism, by
41
Joanne Meyerowitz, "Introduction" in Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2003) 1 at 1 [emphasis added].
42 See e.g. "Transcript of President Bush's Address" CNN (21 September 2001), online: CNN
<http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript>.
43 See Kofi Annan, "The Secretary-General Address to the General Assembly" (23 September
2003), online: United Nations < http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/58/statements/sg2eng030923 >.
4 4 See Richard A. Falk, The Great Terror War (New York: Olive Branch Press, 2003) [Falk, "Terror
War"]; Richard A. Falk, "Rediscovering International Law after September 1ith" (2002) 16 Temp. Int'l
& Comp. L.J. 359 [Falk, "Rediscovering"].
45 Falk, "Terror War," ibid. at xxii, 9; Falk, "Rediscovering," ibid. at 363.
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magnitude, scope, and ideology, representing a serious effort to transform
world order as a whole, and not merely change the power structure of one
or more sovereign states."46 Falk is quick to warn though that the newness
of the "post-9/ll" terrorist threat does not justify most of the other
measures that the Bush administration has taken seemingly in response to
the 9/11 attacks, in particular, its invasion and occupation of Iraq.47
Thus, in Falk's understanding, despite the existence of other forms
of global terrorism before 9/11, because of the uniqueness of the specific
kind of megaterrorist threat that the 9/11 attacks represent, those attacks
created and inaugurated a significantly new global environment. In Falk's
view, the uniqueness of this megaterrorist threat is predicated on four main
distinctive features: its magnitude, scope, ideology, and focus on
transforming world order as a whole. "Magnitude" refers to the fact that
approximately three thousand people were killed in one of those attacks on
one day, and "focus" is self-explanatory. To this Falk adds the important
point about "scope": that the global network character of al-Qaeda, the
organization that planned and executed those attacks, the "elusive" non-
state character of these actors, and the fact that they have "no distinct
territorial locus" of their own and operate in secretive cells in many
countries, holds them out as a new kind of terrorist threat, and makes this
so-called post-9/1 1 era a new moment in global history.48 Furthermore, Falk
notes that this attack was directed against the U.S. homeland, the very
heart of the mightiest global power that recorded human history has
known. It was an attack on the world's only remaining superpower.49
Keeping in mind that the question here is not simply whether al-
Qaeda's threat of megaterrorism "post-9/11" is new, but whether it is so
significantly new as to require the kinds of fundamental modifications in
the international legal regime that the United States has now claimed in
practice, if not in theory (for example, pre-emptive strikes, targeted killings,
and the use of torture), let me begin by examining what I see as the weakest
link in Falk's admittedly quite sophisticated argument. This weakest link is
his argument for international normative change on the basis that the
attack was launched against the world's vastly most powerful state. While
Falk is of course factually correct, it is not clear why such a significantly new
moment in global normative history, and the kinds of drastic international
legal reforms sought by the United States, should be inaugurated not on the
46 Falk, "Terror War," ibid. at 39 [emphasis added].
47 Falk, "Rediscovering," supra note 44 at 363.
4 8 ibid. at 360.
49 Falk, "Terror War," supra note 44 at xxii.
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basis that the attacks killed thousands of people, but simply on the basis
that these victims were killed in the United States as opposed to, say, in
Sierra Leone or the Solomon islands. Thankfully, I do not read Falk as
suggesting this. His implied point, I think, is that even though the 9/11
attacks were new only in relation to U.S. history, the U.S. government and
public was able to use its vast global power to construct its own reality as the
global reality. It was able to do so partly via a constant barrage of the
horrible images of those attacks on television, in newspapers, in memorial
after memorial, and in relentless public flag-waving frenzies. All of these
served to whip up a mega-effect: to overstate the uniqueness of the terror
that was visited on it in global and historical terms. The United States was
also able to harness the dividends of its vastly disproportionate economic,
political, and military power to "persuade" regimes around the world to
join in its portrayal of these events as profoundly inaugural. This point is of
course correct, but nevertheless actually recognizes the fact that the kind
of terrorism that was visited on the United States on 9/11 was not
intrinsically new, but rather was successfully sold as new. This success was
achieved mostly because it happened to a country that had the power to sell
that kind of event as new. It is not clear then that international law and
global institutions should be responding favourably to this myth of newness.
Once the hand of U.S. power in constructing this myth of newness is
unmasked, the myth all but unravels on that score. And one can easily
unmask the hand of power in the construction of this myth by substituting
virtually any third-world state for the United States in the story of 9/11 and
its aftermath (be it Argentina, Angola, or Algeria).
The next weakest link in Falk's argument is that the aims and
activities of al-Qaeda, which is widely regarded as the perpetrator of the
9/11 attacks, represent a uniquely "serious effort to transform world order
as a whole."5 Our "post-9/11" world cannot be said to be new on this score
alone. If the popularly accepted idea of terrorism-especially the sense in
which Falk uses it and most people have come to understand it-is the
deliberate use of violence against non-combatants (that is, civilians) for
purpose of causing fear in order to achieve political goals, then 9/11 was not
the first time that an entity has deployed terrorism as a way of transforming
world order. The United States itself has sponsored and used violence
against civilian populations in third-world states, albeit almost always
through their non-state actor proxies (in Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, and so on), in order to transform the "cold-war" era world
order in which it battled what it perceived as the communist threat to its
50 Falk, "Terror War," supra note 44 at 39.
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power and to the world.5
The third weakest link in Falk's argument is that because of the
sheer magnitude of the number of deaths that megaterrorism can cause in
just one day, the 9/11-style attacks are so significantly new as to justify
certain otherwise untenable international law reforms. This argument is at
once difficult and possible to refute. It is hard to refute because it is not
easy to dismiss the three thousand deaths that were recorded in one attack
on the World Trade Centre as inconsequential in global history. They are
of course consequential. However, the point that has been made by Falk
and others who argue that this marks al-Qaeda's megaterrorism as
significantly new and inaugurates a new world order, is that this sort of
mass killing of civilians is unique in its magnitude to both American and
global history. Yet, in mere seconds U.S. nuclear bombs were deliberately
deployed to kill tens of thousands of innocent Japanese civilians during the
Second World War.52 As Falk himself has recognized, the United States
itself is tainted by its own "megaterrorist use of atomic bombs" against the
civilian populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945."3 Thousands of
innocent civilians have been deliberately or at least recklessly killed in U.S.-
led, U.S.-sponsored, and U.S.-supported conflicts since then. This has been
the case in Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, and so on. In Angola, over
twenty thousand civilians were killed due to a U.S.-sponsored war against
the elected but socialist Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola
(MPLA) regime.54 In El Salvador, over sixty thousand civilians lost their lives
in similar circumstances. In Mozambique, Human Rights Watch has
estimated the civilian death toll at over three hundred thousand.56 If the
objection to this argument is that these happened during wars, one
response could be that, as the Bush Administration has constantly
51See e.g. Human Rights Watch, "Mozambique: Human Rights Development 1990", online:
Human Rights Watch < http://www.hrw.org/reports/1990/WR90/AFRICA.BOU-07.htm#P$)#90345 >
[Human Rights Watch]; Scott Horton & Randy Sellier, "The Unity of Presidential Certifications of
Compliance with United States Human Rights Policy: The Case of El Salvador" (1982) Wis. L. Rev.
825.
52 Richard Falk, Reviving Global Justice, Addressing Legitimate Grievances (2003) [unpublished,
paper on file with the author] at 1 [Falk, "Reviving"].
53 IbM.
54See Ernest Harsch & Tony Thomas, Angola: The Hidden History of Washington's War (New
York: Pathfinder Press, 1976); George Wright, The Destruction ofa Nation: United States' Policy Towards
Angola Since 1945 (London: Pluto Press, 1997).
55 See e.g. Commission on the Truth for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12-year War in
El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador (New York: United Nations, 1993).
56 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 51.
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reminded the public, the current conflict between the United States and al-
Qaeda also has all the trappings of a war. In any case, that conflict has
clearly taken on the form of a war in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the objection
is that the culprits were states rather than non-state actors, the response
could be that, in most of these places, the civilians were killed as a result of
the same kind of collusion between state and non-state actors that al-Qaeda
and Taliban-ruled Afghanistan were accused of.
What is left of the argument in favour of the newness claim is that
the 9/11 attacks were carried out by an elusive "non-state actor" that does
not inhabit a distinct territory of its own and which operates in a network
structure, and that this is a significantly new phenonmenon. Given the
understanding of terrorism offered above, the fact that the attacks on
civilians for political ends was or was not launched by a non-state actor
should ordinarily be immaterial. As the United States' public
pronouncements on the linkages between certain other states and terrorism
confirms, states are as capable of perpetrating terrorism as non-state
actors!57 The focus should largely be on the civilians killed, the terror
inflicted, and the political ends the attacks sought to achieve. Clearly, the
focus ought not be concentrated on the formal political status or character
of the culprit.
That leaves us with the relatively strong argument concerning the
inherent elusiveness of the culprit, a feature that is introduced by the
network character of al-Qaeda, and by its de-coupling from a particular
territorial space-its lack of geographical moorings. This, it is argued,
makes it very difficult for them to be neutralized in conventional ways.
However, it is not true that al-Qaeda was mostly de-coupled from territory.
The United States itself insisted that al-Qaeda was based in Afghanistan at
the time of the 9/11 attacks.58 The fact, then, that its operatives are spread
around the world is not unique. Other entities that have committed terrorist
acts have been similarly constituted (with a headquarters at one location
and operatives around the world). In this connection, it is not difficult to
think of a notable state actor that can be accused of employing a similar
strategy.
Finally, what I will refer to as a "combination argument" can be
discerned: even if each of these grounds on which the newness claim is
The White House, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (17
September 2002) online: <http:/www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> at 4.
58 See "Attack on Afghanistan: Tony Blair Statement" CNN (7 October 2001), online:
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/10/07/gen.blair.speech/>. Prime Minister Blair
reiterates the U.S. justification for the attacks by arguing that "it is clear that they [that is al-Qaeda] are
harboured and supported by the Taliban regime inside Afghanistan" [emphasis added].
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based fails, what is new about the 9/11 attacks and the world that we now
inhabit, is that it was the first time that all these features combined in one
terrorist culprit. Even this combination argument is historically and globally
inaccurate. In Angola, thousands of civilians were deliberately killed by an
elusive non-state actor (in this case a guerrilla group) and this actor was
sponsored and armed by a state that had, and continues to have, global
ambitions. What is more, this non-state actor was highly elusive since it was
to some extent not moored to a particular territory.
The point of the above analytical expos6 is not to suggest that there
are no differences at all between al-Qaeda and other entities that have
engaged in terrorism (be they states or non-state actors) or that our "post-
9/11" globe does not face marginally different challenges in comparison to
the world order that existed before 9/11. The point, rather, is that the
differences between al-Qaeda and those other kinds and iterations of terrorism,
and between the world before and after 9/11, have been significantly overstated
by claims that the "post-9/11 " world is so significantly new that itjustifiespre-
emptive strikes, targeted killings, and acts of torture that would be otherwise
illegal under international law. The so-called post-9/11 world is not so
significantly new as to justify the retrenchment or severe weakening of
fundamental rules of international law so as to afford legal legitimacy to the
pre-emptive strikes that the more powerful states launch against weaker,
usually third-world, countries. While the current al-Qaeda threat is of
course dangerous and worrisome, international lawyers will do well to
remember that many third-world states have been subjected to qualitatively
and quantitatively comparable (and even weightier) incidences of
megaterrorism. The examples of Angola, Mozambique, and El Salvador
that were discussed above are only a few of the all-too-many instances in
which third-world states have been brutally attacked by, or at the instigation
of, U.S.-led and U.S.-sponsored forces, or other covert or regular forces,
leading to the massive loss of civilian lives. At no time were fundamental
international norms rewritten for them as a result of the threats they then
faced. These states were mostly required to work to defeat these threats
within the legal framework established by the UN Charter and other such
treaties.
What TWAIL analysis (with its dogged insistence on history,
continuity, centering the Third World, resisting global hegemony,
demanding increased global equality, and unmasking the hand of power in
the construction of knowledge) affords one, is the desire and capacity to
write the Third World into any characterization of our "post-9/11" world
in order to be in a position to challenge, more effectively, the global validity
of the newness claims that have been made since then, and in the end to
unmask the hands of power in the construction of this myth of newness.
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Ultimately, it seems that it was the United States' vastly dominant global
status that ensured that the "exceptionalist" version of the 9/11 story was
successfully constructed and pressed into the service of the global imperial
ambitions of some in that country.
An important reason for understanding and highlighting this
relationship between the newness claim on the one hand, and the ambitions
and operations of global power on the other hand, is that particular policy
responses may seem much more necessary in the context of the argument
that the globe now faces a significantly new kind of threat, and that all of
us now confront sufficiently significant "innovations in the practices of the
politics of cruelty., 59 Indeed, it is already crystal clear that as they planned
and executed their invasion of Iraq and sought to justify the indefinite
detention of suspected terrorists, and so on, policy makers in the United
States benefitted much from the construction of this old global threat as
significantly new and unique. Without the success they enjoyed in
constructing and purveying this myth of newness, many of their more
controversial responses to the current terrorist threat would have had even
less U.S. and global support, and would have seemed much more misguided
and illegitimate than they already appear to many. While Falk does not
agree with most of their policies, actions, and recommendations, it is not
accidental that most of those who have argued in favour of the legality of
U.S. pre-emptive strikes and use of torture in the course of the so-called
war on terror (and who have therefore wittingly and unwittingly lent
support to the imperial ambition of some in that country), have done so on
the basis that these measures are, on the whole, justified by the significant
newness of the particular kind of terrorist threats posed by al-Qaeda "post-
9/11",.60 Thus, this 9/11-related newness claim has been much utilised as a
"weapon of mass persuasion., 61
The structure of the newness argument that has been made in
support of the imperial-style international law reforms that have been urged
by the United States and some of its allies bears an unnerving resemblance
to the structure of the kinds of newness claims that European powers
deployed in the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, and even much later, as
they sought to legitimize their imperial conquests and occupations of the
Third World. As Antony Anghie has shown in several interventions in the
relevant scholarly debate, the newness to the European colonialists' eyes of
59Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 2.
60 Dershowitz, supra note 40.
61 I borrow this expression from Paul Rutherford. See Paul Rutherford, Weapons of Mass
Persuasion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
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the so-called new worlds of the Americas, Africa, and Asia was a key point
that relevant scholars and government officials of that era deployed in
formulating the kind of international law that would serve their imperial
ambitions.62 As most of these scholars saw it, a novel problem of
international law was presented to international lawyers by Europe's
"discovery" of the "new" native peoples of the Americas, Africa, and
Asia-a problem that required a new solution; new kinds of international
law rules that would allow European colonialists to occupy and govern the
relevant societies. Needless to say, these types of rules were promptly
designed and legitimized by the supposed significant newness and
difference of the native peoples of most of the Americas, Africa, and Asia.
Thus, just as the newness claim has been indispensable to the imperial-type
international law reform objectives of the current U.S. regime and some of
its allies, newness and difference were pivotal elements in the absurd series
of sixteenth and nineteenth century legal maneuvers that ultimately led to
foreign Europeans conferring on themselves the international legal right to
coercively occupy and govern these lands.
The point of this extended inquiry into the validity of the 9/11-
related newness claim has been to challenge and strike at the very
foundations of the worrisome policy responses that have been offered by
the United States and some of its allies to the al-Qaeda threat, as well as
the international law reform projects that have been entailed. To attack
successfully the fulcrum on which these policy responses have been rested
is to hasten and ensure their collapse as ideational edifices in a way that
even a partial adherence to the newness claim does not fully allow.
To be clear, however, the overarching argument of the article is not
necessarily that, despite the 9/11 attacks, a stable political response to the
ravages of global terror is needed (although this may in fact be the correct
posture to adopt). What is being urged is that when third-world experiences
are not discounted, it becomes clear that the "post-9/11" world is not so
significantly new as to justify the sorts of international law reform projects
being urged by the United States and its key "post-9/11" allies.
Consequently, the broader point that is made in this article is that
in the midst of the "post-9/11" coexistence of continuities and
discontinuities in global history, international lawyers ought not to be too
quick to read rupture. Reading rupture rather too quickly might lead us to
accept or tolerate invalid newness claims that facilitate the successful
62 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 13-28; Anghie, "Francisco de Vittoria," supra note 33; and
Anghie, "Time Present and Time Past", supra note 23. See also Antony Anghie, "The War on Terror
and Iraq in Historical Perspective" (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 45.
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execution of the imperial projects of a small minority. The subtle power of
the newness manoeuvre becomes even more palpable when it is realised
that, as Franck has recently noted, in the United States, both the opponents
and proponents of the Bush Administration's argument for international
law reform in favour of the right to execute pre-emptive strikes tend to
agree that the "[al-Qaeda kind of] terrorism is different."63 The fact that
those in the United States who opposed the invasion of Iraq have, broadly
speaking, now lost much political ground to those who supported and
executed that invasion is indicative, to some extent, of the power of the
continuing newness claim as a weapon of mass persuasion (in other words,
as a political practice). The successful construction of a pre-existing threat
as a new one can often authorize the deployment of previously untenable
(and usually much harsher) measures to deal with that problem.
Another point that ought to be made clear is that the argument that
is made in this article is not that every newness claim is incapable of
justifying international law reform. Newness claims have been made for as
long as international society has existed. Not every one of them has been
invalid. For instance, the claims for a "New International Economic Order"
that were made in the 1960s and 1970s by the newly decolonised states were
based on at least one convincing newness claim.64 The nature of this claim
was that these states had just been decolonised and their entrance into the
global economic arena required changes to be made to international
economic law in order to accommodate their entry into the system. The
proponents of the deployment of international law reform to reverse
climate change have also based their claims on at least one valid newness
claim. This claim postulates that the depletion of the ozone layer is a new
and harmful phenomenon, and as such requires immediate ameliorative
action.65 The key in each case is to examine the internal coherence of the
newness argument itself, as well as its validity as a justification for the
particular kind of political project that is being urged.
63 Supra note 38 at 687.
64 See e.g. Immanuel Wallerstein, "An Historical Perspective on the Emergence of the New
International Order: Economic, Political, Cultural Aspects" in Herb Addo, ed., Transforming the World
Economy?: Nine Critical Essays on the New International Economic Order (Tokyo: United Nations
University, 1984) 21.
65 See e.g. Ed Phillips, Crisis in the Atmosphere: The Greenhouse Factor (Phoenix: D.B. Clark,
1990).
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V. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: WHAT TO DO?
The preceding discussion reflects some of the troubling dimensions
of the time in which we now live-the world that many internationalists
seek to change and make better. Yet, critical internationalists have
historically been much better at pointing out the problems with the global
order than at proposing viable alternatives to the status quo. Critical
internationalists tend to share in what Falk, Lester Ruiz, and Robert B.J.
Walker have referred to as "a sense of profound disorientation about,
literally, where 'the international' is going."66
That said, it is obvious that critical internationalists do have much
to contribute to progressive global change. One area in which their critical
craft is particularly useful is in the so-called struggle of ideas. As Falk and
many others have shown, many global powers have managed to maintain
"a public posture of innocence" throughout long national and international
histories of slavery, racism, dispossession, destruction, and exploitation in
the Third World. There is much work to do in carefully unpacking and
resisting the sophisticated and complex processes of denial and myth-
making that have enabled this deceptive posture of innocence to be
maintained.67 This, of course, includes unpacking the myth of newness that
grounds the current agitations for international law reform by certain great
powers. This is one way in which room for international social (and thus
legal) change can be created and enlarged.
All in all, as critical internationalists seek to foster this process of
deep ideational change and epistemic transformation, it is important that
they keep in mind a key point that underlies the discussion in this article:
without taking third-world peoples (especially their broadly shared
histories, experiences, situations, and yearnings) much more seriously than
has hitherto been the case, international lawyers are not likely to succeed
in imagining-and what is more necessary, in helping to create-a much
more equal, fair, and just world. As Craig Calhoun, the President of the
New York-based Social Science Research Council, has correctly noted, the
dominance and privilege that attends living and working in the West all-
too-often "creates blind spots in the vision" of those scholars who live and
work outside the Third World.68 As such, if international law reform is to
66 Richard A. Falk, Lester Edwin J. Ruiz & Robert B.J. Walker, Reframing the International: Law,
Culture, Politics (New York: Routledge, 2002) at ix.
6 7 Falk, "Reviving," supra note 52 at 1.
68 See Craig Calhoun, "Social Science and the Crisis of Internationalism: A Reflection on How
We Work After the War in Iraq," online: Social Science Research Council <http://www.ssrc.org/
president-office/ crisis of internationalism.page>.
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proceed on a coherent, widely legitimized, and ultimately sustainable basis,
TWAIL (a critical internationalist movement that trains its lenses squarely
on the experiences of third-world peoples) must be taken much more
seriously by the authors of international law reform and action. To put in
Professor Ivan Head's terms, no nolumus!

